Decision No. 18,565
Appeal of STEPHANIE SADAM, on behalf of her children, from action of the Board of Education of the Tuckahoe Common School District regarding transportation.
Decision No. 18,565
(May 19, 2025)
Law Office of Mark E. Goidell, attorneys for petitioner, Mark E. Goidell, Esq., of counsel
Ingerman Smith, LLP, attorneys for respondent, Sophia Terrassi, Esq., of counsel
ROSA., Commissioner.--Petitioner challenges a determination of the Board of Education of the Tuckahoe Common School District (“respondent”) denying two of her children (the “students”) transportation to a nonpublic school for the 2024-2025 school year. The appeal must be dismissed.
Petitioner and the students reside in respondent’s district. In August 2024, petitioner requested transportation for the students to the Ross School, a nonpublic school.[1] Respondent utilized the mapping software Google Maps, its usual practice, which calculated the distance between petitioner’s home and the Ross School to be 15.3 miles. The parties continued to discuss petitioner’s transportation request over the ensuing months.
On December 9, 2024, petitioner presented respondent with directions from the mapping software MapQuest that reflected a driving distance of less than 15 miles. The superintendent proceeded to drive the route depicted in the MapQuest directions. In so doing, he discovered that he was unable to take a left turn depicted on the route. The superintendent also learned, from an employee of the district’s transportation provider, that buses could not travel on another of the roads depicted in the MapQuest directions due to an overpass with insufficient clearance.
By letter dated December 10, 2024, respondent informed petitioner that it would not provide transportation to the students because petitioner’s residence was more than 15 miles from the Ross School. The letter indicated that petitioner’s route was not feasible due to the inability to take a left turn and the overpass. This appeal ensued.
Petitioner argues that the distance between her home and the Ross School is less than 15 miles based on her personal observations and MapQuest calculations. She requests a finding that the students are entitled to the requested transportation.
Respondent argues that it reasonably calculated the mileage between petitioner’s home and the Ross School to be greater than 15 miles.
First, I must address a procedural matter. Petitioner submitted additional arguments and evidence together with her reply. The purpose of a reply is to respond to new material or affirmative defenses set forth in an answer (8 NYCRR 275.3, 275.14). A reply is not meant to buttress allegations in the petition or belatedly add assertions that should have been raised in the petition (Appeal of Nappi, 57 Ed Dept Rep, Decision No. 17,300; Appeal of Caswell, 48 id. 472, Decision No. 15,920; Appeal of Hinson, 48 id. 437, Decision No. 15,908). Therefore, while I have reviewed the reply, I have not considered those portions containing new allegations or exhibits that are not responsive to new material or affirmative defenses set forth in the answer.[2]
Turning to the merits, a school district must provide transportation for all children attending grades kindergarten through eight who live between 2 and 15 miles from school and for all children attending grades 9 through 12 who live between 3 and 15 miles from school, the distances in each case being measured by the nearest available route from home to school (Education Law § 3635 [1] [a]; Appeal of Lachman, 56 Ed Dept Rep, Decision No. 17,039; Appeal of Schwab, 47 id. 73, Decision No. 15,630). Transportation for a lesser or greater distance than that set forth in statute may only be provided upon approval by the voters of the district (Education Law § 3635 [1] [a]; Appeal of Lachman, 56 Ed Dept Rep, Decision No. 17,039; Appeal of Bittlingmaier, 45 id. 213, Decision No. 15,305). If such transportation is provided, it must be offered equally to all students in like circumstances residing in the district (Education Law § 3635 [1] [a]; Appeal of Lachman, 56 Ed Dept Rep, Decision No. 17,039).
A board of education has broad discretion to determine how to provide transportation. In making that determination, a board may consider safety, convenience, efficiency, and cost. A board has both the authority and the responsibility to resolve difficult questions that arise when balancing the overall efficiency and economy of a transportation system against the convenience of individual students (Appeal of Bougiamas, 57 Ed Dept Rep, Decision No. 17,306; Appeal of A.P., 48 id. 380, Decision No. 15,891; Appeal of Brizell, 48 id. 128, Decision No. 15,814).
The Commissioner will uphold a district’s transportation determination unless it is arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, or an abuse of discretion (Appeal of Bougiamas, 57 Ed Dept Rep, Decision No. 17,306; Appeal of Lippolt, 48 id. 457, Decision No. 15,914). In an appeal to the Commissioner, a petitioner has the burden of demonstrating a clear legal right to the relief requested and establishing the facts upon which he or she seeks relief (8 NYCRR 275.10; Appeal of P.C. and K.C., 57 Ed Dept Rep, Decision No. 17,337; Appeal of Aversa, 48 id. 523, Decision No. 15,936; Appeal of Hansen, 48 id. 354, Decision No. 15,884).
Petitioner has not met her burden of proof. While petitioner indicates that she has driven the route herself and obtained a measurement of less than 15 miles, she submits no proof in support thereof. Additionally, petitioner has not explained why her MapQuest printout reflecting a distance of less than 15 miles “is more reliable, or should be substituted for, the information obtained from the district via Google Maps” (Appeal of Ruggiero, 59 Ed Dept Rep, Decision No. 17,837; see also Appeal of Xiang, 56 Ed Dept Rep, Decision No. 16,925; Appeal of Yavno, 55 id., Decision No. 16,884; Appeal of Zheng, 54 id., Decision No. 16,776). As indicated above, Google Maps is respondent’s standard method of measuring distance. The record contains no proof suggesting that Google Maps is an inaccurate or unreliable measurement tool. The authority cited by petitioner is not to the contrary (Matter of B.D.H. v Merrick Union Free School Dist., 11 Misc 3d 1071[A] [Sup Ct, Nassau County, 2006] [upholding school district’s measurement of distance using its “consistent … methodology” although parent identified a different, shorter route]; Arlyn Oaks Civic Assn. v Brucia, 171 Misc 2d 634 [Sup Ct, Nassau County, 1997] [concluding that a portion of a route, traversable by cars and buses alike, was “publicly maintained” such that it could be included in measuring distance]).
Petitioner also argues that respondent did not utilize the “nearest available route,” as required by Education Law § 3635 (1) (a) (see generally Appeal of a Student with a Disability, 48 Ed Dept Rep 223, Decision No. 15,844; Appeal of Sanguine, et al., 48 id. 179, Decision No. 15,830). Petitioner admits, however, that “a portion of the route depicted on … MapQuest … concededly is not a viable bus route.”[3] The Commissioner has previously declined to utilize impassable or unsafe portions of a route in calculating distance; such roads cannot be considered “available” (see e.g. Appeal of McGrady, 64 Ed Dept Rep, Decision No. 18,507; Appeal of Staniszewski, 56 id., Decision No. 16,962).
I have considered petitioner’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit.
THE APPEAL IS DISMISSED.
END OF FILE
[1] The Ross School has an Upper and a Lower School; only transportation to the Upper School is at issue in this appeal.
[2] Much of petitioner’s new evidence was submitted in response to respondent’s “affirmative defense” that petitioner “failed to meet the burden of demonstrating a clear legal right to the relief requested.” The Second Circuit has held that “[a]ffirmative defenses which amount to nothing more than mere conclusions of law and are not warranted by any asserted facts have no efficacy” (Shechter v Comptroller of City of N.Y., 79 F3d 265, 270 [2d Cir 1996]; see also Carroll v Trump, 590 F Supp 3d 575, 581-82 [SD NY 2022] [true affirmative defense consists of “new facts and arguments” raised by a defendant “that, if true, will defeat the plaintiff's … claim, even if all allegations in the complaint are true”] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). Thus, respondent’s allegation that petitioner did not meet her burden of proof did not authorize her to submit additional evidence that should have been included with the petition.
[3] Petitioner claims that school buses can, in fact, traverse Stephen Hands Path notwithstanding the overpass. However, she submits no proof in support of this assertion.