Appeal of BLACKSTAR SEAN MILAN ALLAH, on behalf of his child, from action of the Board of Education of the Roosevelt Union Free School District regarding transportation.

Decision No. 18,557

(April 28, 2025)

Guercio & Guercio LLP, attorneys for respondent, Anthony J. Fasano, Esq., of counsel

ROSA., Commissioner.--Petitioner appeals the determination of the Board of Education of the Roosevelt Union Free School District (“respondent”) to deny his child (the “student”) transportation to The Academy Charter School (the “charter school”) for the 2024-2025 school year.  The appeal must be dismissed.

Petitioner and the student reside in respondent’s district and the student attends the charter school located outside the district.  On September 6, 2024, the student’s father emailed a transportation request to the charter school for the 2024-2025 school year.[1]  Respondent denied the request on September 25, 2024 and this appeal ensued.

Petitioner contends, among other things, that his late request should be excused because he did not receive a transportation application as he had in prior years.

Respondent contends that petitioner has failed to meet his burden of proof and that its denial of his late request was reasonable.

I must first address a few procedural issues.  The purpose of a reply is to respond to new material or affirmative defenses set forth in an answer (8 NYCRR 275.3, 275.14).  A reply is not meant to buttress allegations in the petition or belatedly add assertions that should have been raised in the petition (Appeal of Nappi, 57 Ed Dept Rep, Decision No. 17,300; Appeal of Caswell, 48 id. 472, Decision No. 15,920; Appeal of Hinson, 48 id. 437, Decision No. 15,908).  Therefore, while I have reviewed the reply, I have not considered those portions containing new allegations or exhibits that are not responsive to new material or affirmative defenses set forth in the answer.  Similarly, additional affidavits, exhibits, and other supporting papers may only be submitted with the prior permission of the Commissioner (8 NYCRR 276.5).  Therefore, I have not considered petitioner’s additional submissions dated December 31, 2024 and February 3, 2025. 

Pursuant to Education Law § 3635 (2), a parent or guardian must submit a written request for transportation no later than the first day of April preceding the school year for which transportation is sought or, if the parent or guardian did not reside in the district as of April 1, within 30 days after establishing residency in the district.  The purpose of this deadline is to enable districts to budget funds and make necessary arrangements to provide transportation reasonably and economically (Appeal of Doe, 57 Ed Dept Rep, Decision No. 17,295; Appeal of Lippolt, 48 id. 457, Decision No. 15,914).  However, a district may not reject a request for transportation as late if there is a reasonable explanation for the delay (Education Law § 3635 [2]; Appeal of Doe, 57 Ed Dept Rep, Decision No. 17,295).  In the first instance, it is the responsibility of the board of education to determine whether a parent or guardian has offered a reasonable explanation for submitting a late request (Appeal of Doe, 57 Ed Dept Rep, Decision No. 17,295; Appeal of Lippolt, 48 id. 457, Decision No. 15,914).  On appeal, the Commissioner will not set aside the board’s determination unless it constitutes an abuse of discretion (Appeal of Doe, 57 Ed Dept Rep, Decision No. 17,295; Appeal of Lippolt, 48 id. 457, Decision No. 15,914).

In an appeal to the Commissioner, a petitioner has the burden of demonstrating a clear legal right to the relief requested and establishing the facts upon which he or she seeks relief (8 NYCRR 275.10; Appeal of P.C. and K.C., 57 Ed Dept Rep, Decision No. 17,337; Appeal of Aversa, 48 id. 523, Decision No. 15,936; Appeal of Hansen, 48 id. 354, Decision No. 15,884).

Petitioner submitted his transportation request five months after the April 1 deadline.  Petitioner argues that this delay should be excused because respondent, unlike its practice for the past two years, did not send him a form application prior to the deadline.  A board of education, however, has no legal obligation to remind parents of the April 1 deadline (Appeal of Escobar, 57 Ed Dept Rep, Decision No. 17,256; Appeal of Rivera and Figueroa, 52 id., Decision No. 16,449).  Nonetheless, in this case, the record indicates that respondent informed parents of the deadline via its school calendar, website, and automated phone calls (Appeal of Calixte, 64 Ed Dept Rep, Decision No. 18,500).

Even absent a reasonable explanation for the delay, a school district must grant a late transportation request if it can provide the requested transportation under existing transportation arrangements at no additional cost (Appeal of Doe, 57 Ed Dept Rep, Decision No. 17,295; Appeal of Meyerson, 46 id. 421, Decision No. 15,552; Appeal of Capeling, 46 id. 400, Decision No. 15,545).  Where a late transportation request would result in additional cost, however, the district may deny such request.  The Commissioner has consistently sustained denials of untimely applications for transportation where the transportation requested would impose additional costs upon the school district (Appeal of Doe, 57 Ed Dept Rep, Decision No. 17,295; Appeal of Lippolt, 48 id. 457, Decision No. 15,914).

Here, respondent’s assistant superintendent of business and operations estimates that the cost to transport the student would be $7,667.90 for the 2024-2025 school year.  Petitioner did not respond to this assertion.  Therefore, I find that petitioner’s requested transportation would impose additional costs upon respondent.  As such, petitioner has not met her burden of demonstrating a clear legal right to the relief requested (Appeal of Calixte, 64 Ed Dept Rep, Decision No. 18,500).

I have considered petitioner’s remaining contentions and find them to be without merit.

THE APPEAL IS DISMISSED.

END OF FILE