Appeal of MARGARET SIEGRIEST, on behalf of her spouse, from action of the Board of Education of the Nyack Union Free School District regarding removal of recognitions.

Decision No. 18,483

(August 28, 2024)

Barger & Gaines, attorneys for petitioner, Robert M. Tudisco, Esq., of counsel

Keane & Beane, P.C., attorneys for respondent, Ralph C. DeMarco and Suzanne E. Volpe, Esqs., of counsel

ROSA., Commissioner.--Petitioner, on behalf of her spouse (the “spouse”), appeals a determination of the Board of Education of the Nyack Union Free School District (“respondent” or the “board”) to remove all references to her spouse’s name from district facilities and operations.  The appeal must be dismissed.

Prior to the events giving rise to this appeal, respondent named certain athletic facilities, district events, and endeavors in honor of petitioner’s spouse, who had served as a physical education teacher and coach in respondent’s district.  After a former student alleged that another coach (the “coach”) had sexually abused him, respondent investigated whether the spouse knew or should have known of the coach’s conduct.  Respondent concluded that there was insufficient evidence that the spouse had actual or constructive knowledge thereof.  Following extensive public comment on this issue at a board meeting on January 23, 2024, respondent voted to remove the spouse’s name from all district facilities, events, and endeavors.  This appeal ensued.  Petitioner’s request for interim relief was denied on February 28, 2024.

Petitioner argues that respondent’s resolution removing the spouse’s name was unfair, inconsistent with the results of the investigation, and arbitrary  capricious.  She contends that her spouse was entitled to “due process” prior to removal of his name from district facilities and programs.  For relief, she seeks restoration of the spouse’s name to the facilities and programs with which it was associated.

Respondent argues that the appeal must be dismissed for lack of standing.  On the merits, respondent contends that petitioner has failed to meet her burden of proving that the district’s decision was arbitrary and capricious. 

The appeal must be dismissed for lack of standing.  An individual may not maintain an appeal pursuant to Education Law § 310 unless aggrieved in the sense that he or she has suffered personal damage or injury to his or her civil, personal, or property rights (Appeal of Abitbol, 57 Ed Dept Rep, Decision No. 17,333; Appeal of Waechter, 48 id. 261, Decision No. 15,853).  Only an individual who is directly affected by an action has standing to commence an appeal therefrom (Appeal of Abitbol, 57 Ed Dept Rep, Decision No. 17,333; Appeal of Waechter, 48 id. 261, Decision No. 15,853). 

Petitioner alleges no legal injury to support standing in this matter.[1]  This appeal is analogous to Clere v Edwards & Son, where the plaintiff sued a business for “various false claims” that caused “damage ... to the name, character and memory of” her late husband.  While acknowledging the legitimacy of the plaintiff’s grievances, the court found “nothing in the moving affidavit or the complaint to show any damage to the plaintiff's reputation or property damage to her.”  Thus, “[e]ven if the use of [plaintiff’s spouse’s] name in pleadings and affidavits constituted libel or a maligning of his memory, no cause of action would arise in favor of his relatives.”[2]  So too with respect to the instant dispute.  Accordingly, the appeal must be dismissed for lack of standing (see also Waite v City of Elmira, 69 Misc 2d 962, 964 [Sup Ct, Chemung County 1972]; Foster v Sunflower Cnty. Consol. Sch. Dist., 311 So.3d 705, 712 [Miss Ct App 2021]).[3]

Nevertheless, I will briefly address petitioner’s contentions for the benefit of the parties.  I reject petitioner’s argument that her spouse “ha[d] the right to due process” prior to removal of his name from district facilities and programs.  She cites no authority for her contention that a board’s decision to associate an individual’s name with district facilities and programs creates an enforceable property right (see generally Alfred L. Brophy, “The Law and Morality of Building Naming,” 52 S Tex L Rev 37 [2010]).  The names associated with district facilities and programs are within the discretion of boards of education (see Education Law § 1709).  While the Commissioner has not previously articulated a standard by which a board may abuse this discretion, it would require a substantial showing such as a violation of a legal right or bad faith (see generally Appeal of Rickson, 62 Ed Dept Rep, Decision No. 18,211 [describing standard necessary to annul discontinuance of a probationary teacher]).  Petitioner has not made such a showing.

Additionally, I recognize petitioner’s concern that respondent has taken contradictory positions as to whether her spouse knew or had reason to know of the coach’s actions.  While respondent publicly stated that it could not “conclude with a reasonable degree of certainty that [the spouse] knew or should have known of the alleged abuse,” the board president states in an affidavit that

some former students indicated ... that ... there were signs of questionable interactions and/or an inappropriate relationship between [the coach] and [a former student] that they ... thought were obvious to the adults at the time, including [petitioner’s spouse] ....  Other former students reported that they had approached [the spouse] themselves to make [him] aware, or had heard that [he] was made aware that there were concerns about the appropriateness of the relationship between [the coach] and [a former student].

An executive summary of respondent’s investigation indicates that some of the “claims and statements” made by these witnesses “were unable to be corroborated and, in some instances, ... found to be inaccurate and/or unsubstantiated.”  For the benefit of petitioner and the school community, I encourage respondent to definitively determine whether petitioner’s spouse should have known of any alleged abuse—irrespective of whether any facilities or programs bear the spouse’s name.

THE APPEAL IS DISMISSED.

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